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PROPERTY
LAW
I. DEVELOPER'S FIDUCIARY DUTY TO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS

In Goddard v. Fairways Development General Partnership' the South
Carolina Court of Appeals held that a developer owes a fiduciary duty to a
condominium association to keep the common areas in good repair until the
association acquires title in the common areas.2 The court based this
fiduciary duty on a corollary it found between the developer of a planned unit
development ("PUD") and the promoter of a corporation This case marks
the first time a South Carolina court recognized such a fiduciary duty in
condominium law.'

Although the original PUD design, developed by the respondent, Fairways
Development General Partnership, envisioned building approximately ninety
villas, only five villas were complete at the date of this lawsuit.' A "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" ("Declarations") governed the
PUD and created the "Fairway Villas Homeowners Association" ("Association"), in which all villa owners were mandatory members. 6 Through the
Declarations, the developer maintained superior voting power in the Association.7 Prior to 1987 when the developer conveyed the common areas to the
Association, the developer paid for maintenance of the common areas.
However, after the conveyance, the Association was to maintain those areas
through assessments paid by the owners. Because of its superior voting
power, the developer completely controlled the amount of the assessments s
With only six lot owners in the PUD,9 the appellants questioned the

1. _ S.C. _, 426 S.E.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. Id. at _,
426 S.E.2d at 832-33.
3. Id. at,
426 S.E.2d at 832.
4. The court noted that "[c]ourts of equity have been careful to define fiduciary relationships
so as not to exclude new cases that may give rise to the relationship." Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at
832 (citing Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 599, 358 S.E.2d 150, 152 (Ct. App.
1987)).
5. Id. at __, 426 S.E.2d at 829.
6. Goddard, _ S.C. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 830.
7. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 830 n. 1. The "owners," excluding the developer, each received
one vote for each "lot" owned. The developer received 50 votes for each "lot" owned and a
total of 1500 votes for the existing "parcels." Upon subdivision of each "parcel," the developer
received 50 votes for each resulting "lot." Id. at _ n.1, 426 S.E.2d at 830 n.1.
8. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 830.
9. In addition to the five lot owners of the completed villas, the developer owned a lot. Id.
at _ n.3, 426 S.E.2d at 830 n.3. The Declarations only required lot owners to pay
assessments, and the undeveloped parcels in the PUD were not subject to assessments until they
were subdivided into lots. Therefore, the developer only paid an assessment on the one lot it
owned. Id. at _,
426 S.E.2d at 830.
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PUD's viability. Because the present assessments proved inadequate to
maintain the common areas, the owners sought to force the developer to pay
assessments in proportion to its voting power. Alternatively, the owners
sbught dissolution of the PUD, transfer of the common areas to them in fee
simple, and conversion of the PUD into a standard subdivision. The masterin-equity refused both requests.'"
At the court of appeals, the owners sought reversal of the master's ruling
on several grounds. First, the owners challenged their ownership interest in
the common areas, claiming the developer actually owned these areas."
However, the court of appeals affirmed the master's holding that the
maintenance of the common areas was indeed the Association's responsibility
as owner of those areas. 2 The court further affirmed the master's refusal to
grant a dissolution of the PUD because the master dismissed one owner from
the suit, and the PUD could not be dissolved without all owners present. 3
Contrary to the master's holding, the court found the owner was an indispensa change in the form of ownership would affect her
able party because
14
property interest.
Second, the owners argued that they were entitled to a jury trial as a
matter of right because they sought monetary relief based on their fraud and
misrepresentation allegations. 15 However, the court of appeals held that the
order of reference to the master referred only equitable issues. 16 Furthermore, the court held that a party's failure to immediately appeal an order
deprives the party of the mode of trial to which it is entitled and leaves the
jury trial issue unpreserved for review.17
Third, the owners claimed error in the master's refusal to permit
testimony of the developer's alleged misrepresentations. 8 The court of
appeals held that the master erred in applying the parole evidence rule to
exclude the evidence because the evidence was proffered to address the failure
of consideration or to establish a basis for nullifying the Declarations.' 9

10. Id. at __, 426 S.E.2d at 830.
11. Goddard, __ S.C. at __, 426 S.E.2d at 831.
12. Id. at _,
426 S.E.2d at 831. The court did not decide whether the deed conveying the
common areas had been effectively delivered to the Association because the trial judge never
ruled on the issue, and the appellants did not raise it in post-trial motions. Therefore, the court
did not address the issue of the conveyance's validity, when at the time of execution the
Association remained unincorporated. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 831.
13. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 831.
14. Id.at , 426 S.E.2d at 831 (citing Stewart v. State Crop Pest Comm'n, 307 S.C. 133,
414 S.E.2d 121 (1992)).
15. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 833.
16. Goddard, __ S.C. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 833.
17. Id.at
, 426 S.E.2d at 833.
18. Id. at
, 426 S.E.2d at 833.
19. Id. at __,426 S.E.2d at 833.
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However, the court found error harmless because the testimony would have
been cumulative.20
Finally, the owners challenged the master's finding that the developer did
not breach a fiduciary duty to the villa owners.21 The owners argued that as
a result of the developer's superior voting strength, the developer owed the
owners a fiduciary duty 1) "to assess the villa owners at a level necessary to
maintain sufficient reserves to adequately maintain the common areas"' and
2) "to insure that the common areas were in good repair at the time they were
conveyed to the Association and that the Association had sufficient funds to
maintain the common areas. "I Considering the developer's alleged fiduciary
duty, the court first analyzed the developer's assessment of fees under the
"business judgment rule."24 The court declined to question the intra vires
action of a nonprofit corporation's board, especially when the board exercised
its business judgment.' Because the facts did not show bad faith, dishonesty, or incompetence by the developer, the court held that the developer
violated no fiduciary duty by failing to vote for higher assessments.26
As to the owners' second contention - that the developer owed a
fiduciary duty at the time of the conveyance - the court ruled that a fiduciary
relationship did exist between the developer and the owners before the
organization of the Association and the conveyance of the common areas to the
Association.27 This landmark holding creates an entirely new fiduciary
relationship in South Carolina property law.
The court reaffirmed its definition of a fiduciary relationship as set forth
in Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norri 2 s as one in which a party "'reposes a
special confidence in another, so that the latter, in equity and good conscience,
is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one
imposing the confidence.'"29 Further, the court noted that in Duncan v.
Brookview House, Inc.3" it found a fiduciary relationship existed between a

20. Id. at
, 426 S.E.2d at 833.
21. Goddard, __ S.C. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 831.
22. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 831 (citing Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev.
Co., 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1981)).
23. Id. at
, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
24. Id. at __, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
25. Id. at
, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
26. Goddard, __ S.C. at_, 426 S.E.2d at 832 (citing 4 S.C. JURIS. Condominiums § 42
(1991)).
27. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
28. 292 S.C. 595, 358 S.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1987).
29. Goddard, __ S.C. at,
426 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Island Car Wash, Inc., 292 S.C.
at 599, 358 S.E.2d at 152).
30. 262 S.C. 449, 205 S.E.2d 707 (1974).
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corporation's promoters and the corporation they were creating."
Goddardcourt found a "corollary" between the promoters in Duncan and the
developer of a PUD because "[b]oth are entrusted by interested investors to
bring about a viable organization to serve a specific function."3 2 Based on
that corollary, the court held that because the developer failed to maintain
those areas and to establish a fund sufficient to maintain those areas until the
assessments were adequate, the developer breached its fiduciary duty to the
owners and to the Association.33 The court remanded the case for a determination of the developer's liability in an amount not to exceed the cost the
developer would have incurred in bringing the common areas up to standard
at the time of conveyance.
The Goddarddecision aligns South Carolina with several other states that
recognize a fiduciary relationship between a developer and a condominium
association.3" Other state courts also resort to corporate law to determine
whether a developer owes a fiduciary duty to an association.3 6 Because most
associations are organized as nonprofit corporations, the developer often
assumes a dual role as developer-promoter of the PUD and as director or
officer of the association until the association is self-sufficient. "The effect [of
this dual role] is that the developer during the period has two separate and
distinct loyalties: the operation of the association and the development and
marketing of the project." 37 Such inherent conflict of interest greatly exposes
the developer to liability.3" Generally, this liability arises in situations where
the developer fails to manage the association adequately or where the

31. Goddard, - S.C. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
32. Id. at
, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
33. Id. at
34. Id. at
426 S.E.2d at 833.
35. See, e.g., Cohen v. S & S Constr. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 173 (Ct. App. 1983); Ireland v.
Wynkoop, 539 P.2d 1349 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n v. Hill
Dev. Corp., 414 A.2d 1177 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980); Old Port Cove Property Owners Ass'n v.
Ecelestone, 500 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam); Kirtley v. McClelland, 562
N.E.2d 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson's Landing Owners' Ass'n, 758
S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
36. E.g., Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 171 Cal. Rptr. 334,343 (Ct.
App. 1981); Wynkoop, 539 P.2d at 1357; HillDev. Corp., 414 A.2d at 1183-84; Ecclestone, 500
So. 2d at 333; McClelland,562 N.E.2d at 33. Courts also find a fiduciary relationship between
a home owner or a condominium association and its members because of the association's
corporate status. E.g., Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Ct. App.
1983); Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151 (111.App. Ct. 1983). For a general discussion of
the potential liabilities for condominium and home owners associations, see Wayne S. Hyatt &
James B. Rhoads, Concepts ofLiability in the Development andAdministrationof Condominium
and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915 (1976).
37. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 36, at 973.
38. See id.
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developer engages in self-dealing.39
A developer in control of an association assumes management and
supervision responsibilities similar to those of a corporate director or
officer.4 Therefore, the developer may be held liable if such control results
in mismanagement. 4 For example, in Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v.
Knuppe Development Co.,42 the California Court of Appeals held that a
developer breached its fiduciary duty to an association by improperly
supervising and managing the association in its infancy.43 In Raven's Cove
the developer and its employees served as the original directors of the
association; and as such, they failed to adequately assess the condominium
owners to create a sufficient reserve fund for maintenance of the common
areas." The court found the foremost commentary in condominium association law45 persuasive to its decision and quoted the following:
"Where a developer or sponsor totally dominates the association .... the

principles of fiduciary duty established with business corporations 'may
exist for holding those exercising actual control over the group's affairs to
a duty not to use their power in such a way as to harm unnecessarily a
substantial interest of a dominated faction."46

Other examples of mismanagement by a developer in control of the association
include the developer's failure to disclose roof defects to the association47 as
well as the developer's failure to enforce and administer the PUD's declaration.48

39. See id. at 973-77.
40. See Hill Dev. Corp., 414 A.2d at 1183-84.
41. Cohen v. S & S Constr. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 173, 175 (Ct. App. 1983); cf. Munder v.
Circle One Condominium, Inc., 596 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding mere
failure of a developer to renew a fire insurance policy is insufficient grounds to hold the
developer liable, absent some showing of fraud, self-dealing, unjust enrichment, or betrayal of
truth).
42. 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1981) (cited by the owners in Goddard v. Fairways
Development General Partnership, _ S.C. __, 426 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Ct. App. 1993)).
43. Id. at 344.
44. Id.
45. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 36. Unfortunately, the amount of scholarly discourse
addressing this area is disproportionately smaller than the significant growth in the development
of condominiums.
46. Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (quoting Hyatt & Rhoads, supra
note 36, at 923 (quoting Note, JudicialControlofActions of PrivateAssociations, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 983, 1004 (1963))).
47. Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n v. Hill Dev. Corp., 414 A.2d 1177 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1980).
48. Cohen v. S & S Constr. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 173 (Ct. App. 1983). A developer serving
as a director or officer of an association should also recognize the potential for extension of
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A developer in control of an association also "'may not make decisions
for the Association that benefit [its] own interest at the expense of the
association and its members. ,, 49 The dual role of developer and officer or
director of an association presents an inherent conflict of interes5 because
decisions the director makes for the benefit of the association may in fact be
detrimental to the developer's own economic interests. For instance, does the
developer pay for repairs to common areas out of its own pocket or out of the
association's pocket? The developer's interest in self-preservation combined
with its drive to make a profit often draw judicial scrutiny on conflict
situations that have the appearance of self-dealing. For example, in Kirtley v.
McClelland51 the Indiana Court of Appeals held a partner of a development
company, who also controlled the condominium association, liable for
appropriating to his own use a business opportunity that rightfully belonged to
the association. 2
Though many states support and use the analogy of corporate fiduciary

law to condominium associations,53 this practice is not without reproach.
One legal commentator suggests that a developer should only incur the general
obligations imposed by tort and contract law. 54 Professor Natelson suggests
that the imposition of fiduciary duties upon a developer is "more an accident

liability into the personal injury arena, particularly if the developer causes the tortious injury or
act. However, the California Supreme Court rejected such an extension in a case in which the
plaintiff was physically attacked in her condominium. Frances T. v. Village Green Owners
Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 587 (Cal. 1986) (holding that the association's directors owed no fiduciary
duty to the plaintiff because any duty owed arose from her status as a tenant rather than as a
shareholder in the association).
49. S & S Constr. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (quoting Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc., 171
Cal. Rptr. at 343); accordOld Port Cove Property Owners Ass'n v. Ecclestone, 500 So. 2d 331
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam); Kirtley v. McClelland, 562 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990).
50. See generallySalvatore LaMonica, Note, DeveloperLeases Under the Condominiumand
CooperativeAbuse ReliefAct of 1980, 15 HOFSTR L. RV. 631 (1987) (presenting various ways
Florida developers may abuse their position at the expense of condominium owners and
discussing legislation designed to curtail such abuse).
51. 562 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
52. Id. at 33. See also Ecclestone, in which the condominium association claimed that the
developer, as the association's president, breached his fiduciary duty by requiring the association
to purchase the PUD's roads and assume responsibility for their maintenance, while retaining a
rent-free easement in the road system to allow access to the commercial areas. 500 So. 2d at
333. However, applying corporate law fiduciary principles, the court determined that the
developer was not liable for any breach because the arrangement was reasonable at the time of
the contract's execution. Id. at 336.
53. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
54. Robert G. Natelson, Keeping Faith: Fiduciary Obligations in Property Owners
Associations, 11 VT. L. Rv. 421 (1986).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/14

6

1993]

et al.: Property Law
PROPERTY LAW

of legal process than a matter of conscious policy.""5 He argues that courts
and legal commentators began to view developers as trustees of the owners'
interests in an association, instead of as mere business people." This view
unfairly targeted the developer's actual profits, and not just the developer's
secret profits secured by any fraud or nondisclosure.57 Professor Natelson
would only allow breach of fiduciary duty claims based on traditional
standards of contractual duties, obligations of good faith and due care, or
58
obligations under general corporate law.
With its holding in Goddard, the court of appeals clearly interjected
corporate fiduciary duties into condominium law. This extension could create
a new cause of action against developers in addition to or in lieu of traditional
tort and contract causes of action. Further, the breach of fiduciary duty claim
may be easier to prove than some tort claims (e.g., fraud) and may avoid the
privity problems present in contract actions. 59 Finally, claimants suing under
a breach of fiduciary duty theory may recover the developer's unjust
enrichment (increased profits), especially in cases of self-dealing.'
When read broadly, Goddard seems to create a new area of developer
liability. However, many unanswered questions remain for the courts to
address. For example, to whom does a developer owe a fiduciary duty-the
association, its individual members, potential purchasers, third parties or
remote purchasers? When does this fiduciary relationship begin, and when
does it end? Does the duty include a duty of loyalty (i.e., no self-dealing) as
well as the duty of care (i.e., no mismanagement of reserve funds)? What is
the measure of damages involved with breach of this duty? Hopefully, these
issues will be addressed in upcoming cases. One matter is certain-the South
Carolina courts will likely look to corporate fiduciary relationships for the
answers.
Constance R. Boken

55. Id. at 453.
56. Id. at 454. Professor Natelson also notes that developers often staffed the association's
initial board of directors with employees, associates, or attorneys, in order to satisfy the
incorporation requirements. These "paper positions" merely accommodated the developer, but
as the court's view changed, these directors suddenly found themselves vulnerable to corporate
liability. Id.
57. Id. at 462 (stating that for some commentators and judges "the doctrine of fiduciary duty
was a mechanism to serve their personal redistributionist goals").
58. Id. at 465.
59. Natelson, supra note 54, at 466.
60. Id. (stating that the possible recovery of the developer's increased profits (unjust
enrichment) may have made the fiduciary duty theory more attractive).
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II. COURT INTERPRETS STREET-CLOSING STATUTE

In Hoogenboom v. City ofBeaufort' the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that section 57-9-20 of the South Carolina Code2 does not empower
courts to vest title to an abandoned public street in the abutting landowners,
but merely allows courts to declare in whom the legal title rests.3 Consequently, the court of appeals' holding significantly reduces the potential scope
of section 57-9-20 as compared with street-closing statutes of other states.
The respondent, Irene J. Hoogenboom, sued the City of Beaufort to quiet
title to a strip of land abutting her lot. Hoogenboom's lot, designated as Block
Three on the tax maps and plats of record, was bordered on the west by Short
Street; on the north by Laurens Street; on the east by two parcels of land and
marsh of the Beaufort River; and on the south by marsh and the land in
dispute. 4 Known as "The Extension," the disputed strip was an eastward
extension of King Street which regularly carried pedestrian and vehicular
traffic to the marsh of the Beaufort River until late in the nineteenth century. 5
As an alternative to her quiet title action, Hoogenboom petitioned the court
to close The Extension and vest her with title to the street in accordance with
South Carolina Code sections 57-9-10 to -40.6
The master in equity found in favor of Hoogenboom on both claims,
holding that the city failed to established fee simple ownership of The
Extension,7 and also awarding Hoogenboom title under section 57-9-20.8

1. __ S.C. _, 433 S.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1992).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1991). "If the court shall determine that it is
to be the best interest of all concerned that such street, road or highway be abandoned or closed,
the court shall then determine in whom the title thereto shall be vested and issue an appropriate
order." Id.
3. Hoogenboom, _

S.C. at

_,

433 S.E.2d at 884.

4. For a graphic illustration of the area, see id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 879.
5. Recent photographs of The Extension do not indicate a travelled street or lines of
demarcation, but instead portray what appears to be a consolidated part of Hoogenboom's yard.
See Plaintiff's Exhibits 27-A to -D.
6. Hoogenboom, _

S.C. at _,

433 S.E.2d at 878; see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-10

to -40 (Law. Co-op. 1991). The Code describes the procedure as follows:
Any interested person. . . may petition a court of competent jurisdiction to abandon
or close any street, road or highway whether opened or not. Prior to filing the
petition, notice of intention to file shall be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper published in the county where such street, road or
highway is situated. Notice shall also be sent by mail requiring a return receipt to
the last known address of all abutting property owners whose property would be
affected by any such change.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-9-10.
7. Hoogenboom, _

8. Id. at _,

S.C. at_, 433 S.E.2d at 881.

433 S.E.2d at 883.
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Finding error in both of the master's decisions, 9 the court of appeals
reversed.'0
Considering the master's decision to quiet title in Hoogenboom, the court
of appeals began by stating the following common law rule: "In an action to
quiet title, the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, not on
the alleged weakness of the defendant's title."" Consequently, the court of
appeals rejected the master's decision by holding that Hoogenboom, not the
city, bore 2the burden of establishing that she indeed held title to The
Extension.
Hoogenboom first attempted to prove title to The Extension by showing
an unbroken chain of conveyances of Block Three beginning with an 1863
deed of the United States Board of Direct Tax Commissioners. 13 In 1862 and
1863, in an effort to collect delinquent property taxes from southern property
owners who refused to pay because of the Civil War, Congress authorized the
Board of Direct Tax Commissioners to sell any property with delinquent taxes.
In 1863 the Commissioners sold Block Three pursuant to such a tax sale.
However, the court of appeals held that the tax deed from the Commissioners
did not convey title to The Extension because the strip was already municipal
property at the time of the purported conveyance, and consequently, was
exempt from sale by the Commissioners for unpaid taxes.'"
Hoogenboom asserted that The Extension was not necessarily municipal
property at the time of the purported conveyance because the City of Beaufort
could have acquired The Extension prior to the 1863 tax sale by a means
which left the fee simple ownership interest vested in the original owner of
Block Three.' 5 In response, the court of appeals noted that in 1811 the
General Assembly authorized the City of Beaufort to lay out streets and pay
compensation for damages sustained by any landowners. 6 The General
Assembly further provided that upon such payment, title to the property vested

9. Id. at ___,
433 S.E.2d at 881, 883.
10. Id. at
433 S.E.2d at 885.
11. Id. at __,433 S.E.2d at 880 (citing Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S.C. 61, 115 S.E. 727
(1923); Hammond v. Halsey, 287 S.C. 46, 336 S.E.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1985)).
12. Hoogenboom, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 880-81.
13. Presumably Hoogenboomdemonstrated the unbroken chain of conveyancesof Block Three
in an attempt to show ownership of The Extension because "as a general rule, the fee to the right
of way of certainly most highways in this state remains in the abutting landowners." South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Allison, 246 S.C. 389, 393, 143 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1965).
14. Hoogenboom, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 881-82. "It is a well settled rule that the
property of municipal corporations, when appropriated to public uses, is exempt from taxation."
Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 881 (citing City of Somerville v. City of Waltham, 48 N.E. 1092
(Mass. 1898)).
15. Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 882.
16. Id. at __,433 S.E.2d at 879 (citing Act of Dec. 20, 1811, No.1998, 5 S.C. Stat. 649
(Cooper ed. 1839) (authorizing the intendant and wardens of Beaufort to lay out streets)).
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in the city in fee simple. 7 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
Hoogenboom bore the burden of proving' 8 that the city acquired the property
by some means other than paying compensation in accordance with the
General Assembly's authorization.' 9 Because Hoogenboom failed to do so,
the court presumed that the city complied with the statute allowing it to lay out
and receive fee simple title in such streets, once it paid the owner due
compensation.'
Consequently, the court held that Under the Act of 1811,
The Extension became municipal property when the city laid it out as part of
King Street. 2'
Hoogenboom next attempted to prove her title to The Extension by
claiming that it was dedicated to the City of Beaufort prior to the Civil War
and was later abandoned as a street by the city prior to 1920.22 The master
found that although no evidence showed an express dedication of The
Extension, some evidence did show an express dedication of nearby Short
Street. 3 Consequently, the master found an implied dedication of The
Extension because the city failed to prove its title to The Extension.24 The
court of appeals disagreed and reiterated that in a quiet title action, Hoogenboom bore the burden of proving a dedication as a matter of law.Y Accordingly, the court of appeals held that no dedication or abandonment of The
Extension existed because Hoogenboom failed to produce any evidence of
either an express or an implied dedication. 6
As an alternative to the quiet title action, Hoogenboom successfully
petitioned the master to vest her with title to The Extension under the state's
street-closing statutes. 7 South Carolina Code section 57-9-10 provides that
a person may petition a court to close a street if (1) notice of the intention to

17. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 880.
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. Hoogenboom,__ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 882.
20. Id. at
, 433 S.E.2d at 882.
21. Id. at
, 433 S.E.2d at 882. "Itis undisputed that the intendant and wardens of
Beaufort laid out King Street to the marsh of the Beaufort River," thereby including The
Extension. Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 882. A 1773 plan of Beaufort shows King Street extending
all the way to the marsh of the Beaufort River. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 22B.
22. Hoogenboom,__ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 883.
23. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 883. Short Street runs north and south along Block Three's
western border. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
24. Hoogenboom, - S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 883.
25. Id. at_, 433 S.E.2d at 883; see also notes 11-12 and accompanying text. The court
of appeals stated that in a quiet title action, "the party claiming a dedication must show: (1) that
the owner of the land upon which the street was laid out dedicated it to a public use ... ; (2)
that the street has been abandoned; and (3) that he is the fee simple owner of the abutting
property." Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 883.
26. Id. at
, 433 S.E.2d at 883.
27. Id. at
, 433 S.E.2d at 883.
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file is published once a week for three weeks in a county newspaper where the
street is located prior to the petition, and (2) such notice is sent by mail to
abutting property owners.2" Section 57-9-20 further provides that upon such
petition, if the court finds that closing the street serves the best interest of all
concerned, "the court shall then determine in whom the title thereto shall be
vested and issue an appropriate order."29 The court of appeals reversed the
master's decision to vest title, holding that the statutes did not empower courts
to divest the legal owner and vest in another the title to a public street.3 0 In
so deciding, the court initially considered the two predominant methods.by
which a municipality can acquire property for use as a street.
First, the municipality can acquire fee simple title to the street.31 In
such a case, if the municipality later abandons use of the property as a public
street, the municipality still retains possession of the property and can use it
for any public purpose regardless of its previous use.32 Second, the municipality can acquire a mere right of passage over the property by a dedication
of the property to the public for use as a street. 33 With dedication, fee
simple title remains in the landowner who initially dedicated the property to
4
public use, but the title is burdened by the public right of passage.
However, if the municipality abandons the right of passage, then the fee
35
simple interest becomes unencumbered.
The court reasoned that it must interpret section 57-9-20 in light of these
36
common-law rules governing the acquisitions of property for use as streets.
The court recognized:
The Legislature is presumed to enact legislation with reference to existing
law, and there is a strong presumption that it does not intend by statute to
change the common law rules. A statute is not to be construed as in
derogation of common law rights if another interpretation is reasonable.
Statutes in derogation of common law are to be construed strictly to
preserve vested rights.37

28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-9-10 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
29. Id. § 57-9-20 (emphasis added).
30. Hoogenboom, __ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 884.
31. Id. at
, 433 S.E.2d at 884.
32. Id. at_, 433 S.E.2d at 884 (citing Marietta Chair Co. v. Henderson, 49 S.E. 312 (Ga.
1904)).

33. Id. at_,
34.
35.
36.
37.

433 S.E.2d at 883.

Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 883-84.
Hoogenboom, - S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 883-84.
Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 884.
Id. at __ n.5, 433 S.E.2d at 884 n.5 (citations omitted).
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Turning to the statutes, the court held that the legislature created the
statutes solely to provide a judicial procedure thereby removing the uncertainty
surrounding the common-law rules of dedication and abandonment and
avoiding the common-law rule requiring strict proof of intent to abandon.3 8
Contrary to Hoogenboom's assertion, the court stated: "Nothing in Section 579-20 suggests, however, that the court is given the power to create or destroy
a fee simple interest in property. . . .It exists to remove uncertainty as to title
and to provide repose for the holder of the fee simple interest. " " Consequently, the court declared that section 57-9-20 did not authorize courts to vest
and divest title, but merely allowed courts to declare who holds title according
to the law.40 Therefore, in accordance with the common-law rules, the court
of appeals held that Hoogenboom bore the burden of proving either that fee
simple to The Extension remained in the owner of Block Three, or that the
city later conveyed title to The Extension to the owner. 41 Because Hoogenboom failed to present any such evidence, the court of appeals held that she
could not acquire title to The Extension under section 57-9-2042
When the court of appeals placed the burden of proof upon Hoogenboom
to recover on the strength of her own title, it clearly dictated the outcome of
her quiet title action. Requiring Hoogenboom to recover on the strength of
her own title and not the weakness of the city's title proved insurmountable
because "[a]ntebellum land records for Beaufort County were destroyed in the
Civil War."'3 As a result, Hoogenboom could only speculate about the chain
of events involving The Extension and Block Three prior to the 1863 tax sale.
In the absence of other evidence and without the antebellum records,
Hoogenboom could not prove that the city acquired The Extension from the
owner of Block Three without paying the statutorily required compensation.44
Additionally, without the land records, Hoogenboom could not prove that The

433 S.E.2d at 884. For example, the court pointed out that under the common
38. Id. at,
law, only abutting landowners who suffered some peculiar harm different from that suffered by
the general public could bring an action over property dedicated to public use. Id. at __ n.6, 433
S.E.2d at 884 n.6 (citing Cason v. Gibson, 217 S.C. 500, 61 S.E.2d 58 (1950); Bethel Methodist
Episcopal Church v. City of Greenville, 211 S.C. 442, 45 S.E.2d 841 (1947)). Additionally, the
claimant must prove abandonment by unequivocal acts that show a clear intent to abandon, and
as long as the use is consistent with the property's original dedicated purpose, abandonment will
not result. Id. at __ n.7, 433 S.E.2d at 884 n.7 (citing City of Myrtle Beach v. Parker, 260 S.C.
475, 197 S.E.2d 290 (1973)).
39. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 884 (emphasis added).
40. Hoogenboom, __ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 884.
, 433 S.E.2d at 884-85.
41. Id. at
, 433 S.E.2d at 885.
42. Id. at
, 433 S.E.2d at 880.
43. Id. at
44. As asserted by the city's counsel, the master in equity required the impossible by placing
the burden of proof upon the city to prove that it paid the private owner ofThe Extension in 1811
when the street was laid out. Brief of Appellant at 10.
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Extension was dedicated to the city prior to the Civil War; and consequently,
she could not prove that fee simple title to The Extension remained in the
owner of Block Three and any successors in title.45
However, a solid foundation exists for the common-law rule that in a
quiet title action, the plaintiffs must recover on the strength of their own title,
and not on the weakness of the defendant's title.46 The rule provides security
to the holders of legal title by protecting such holders from defending against
unmeritorious claims to their property. For example, if the city bore the
burden of proving title in every quiet title action brought against it, the city
would probably lose claims that required tracing title to destroyed antebellum
land records.47 Such a burden of proof would encourage unmeritorious
claims because plaintiffs could exploit the loss of the antebellum records.
Although the court of appeals ultimately reached the correct result in
Hoogenboom, a different construction of section 57-9-20 could have produced
the same result. Many states have statutes similar to South Carolina's dealing
with closed or abandoned streets. Although the approaches vary, several states
provide a statutory procedure for return of the abandoned property to private
landowners. 48 Some of these statutes declare that upon abandonment, the
street "reverts" to the abutting property owners. However, these statutes leave
unclear whether revert means that the fee simple title held by the abutting
landowners becomes unencumbered by the public's easement, or whether the
fee simple title held by the public vests in the abutting landowners.
On the other hand, some statutes are more specific. For example, Florida
Code section 336.0949 allows the board of county commissioners, upon
motion or outside petition, to "[r]enounce and disclaim any right of the county
and the public in and to any land, or interest therein, acquired by purchase,
gift, devise, dedication or prescription for street, alleyway, road or highway
purposes."" Similarly, Georgia Code sections 32-7-1 to -451 allow the
counties to abandon a public road and sell the property to the highest

45. See Hoogenboom, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 883.
46. Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 880 (citing Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S.C. 61, 115 S.E. 727
(1923); Hammond v. Halsey, 287 S.C. 46, 336 S.E.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1985)).
47. A fortiori, the master in equity reached the opposite result in Hoogenboom's quiet title
action by incorrectly placing the burden of proof upon the city to prove its title to The Extension.
See id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 881.
48. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.40.160 (1992); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1902 (Supp. 1993);
COLO. REV.STAT. § 43-2-106 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-118 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
336.09 to -. 12 (Harrison 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-1 to -4 (Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE
§ 40-203 (1993); IowA CODE ANN. § 354.23 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-443
(1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 88.637,88.673 (Vernon 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-3,107, 15701, 16-611 (1991).
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 336.09 (Harrison 1992).
50. Id. ch. 336.09(b) (emphasis added).
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-7-1 to -4(Michie 1991).
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bidder.52 The county may then "execute a quitclaim deed conveying such
property to the purchaser. " 5 Iowa Code section 354.2314 provides that a
city or county can abandon a public street by a resolution passed after a public
hearing. 55 The city or county may then convey title to the abandoned street
by either a deed or a vacation instrument.5 6 Finally, Nebraska Code section
16-61 157 allows a vacated street to be "sold and conveyed by the city for any
price that shall be agreed upon by the mayor and three-fourths of the city
council. "5 8
Obviously, these statutes are much more extensive and specific than South
Carolina Code section 57-9-20. Further, the court rightfully hesitated to
interpret the statute in a way that would destroy the city's vested rights in the
property. A clearer expression of legislative intent is needed from the General
Assembly. However, at the very least, the street-closing statutes from other
states suggest that the court of appeals could have interpreted section 57-9-20
as empowering courts to vest legal title into abutting property owners once a
street was abandoned and the statutory prerequisites were met. In the absence
of legislative history discussing the statute, the other states' statutes could shed
light on what the South Carolina General Assembly actually intended.
Additionally, the phrase "shall be vested" in section 57-9-20 indicates that
the legislature intended the future tense. If section 57-9-20 only allows the
court to declare in whom legal title rests, then nothing remains to vest and the
words "shall be vested" become unnecessary. For example, if a dedicated
street is abandoned, the fee simple does not then vest in the owner of the
property because it was already vested. The property merely becomes free
from the encumbrance of the dedication or easement. Thus, the legislature
might have included the words "shall be vested" to allow the court to divest
title and declare in whom legal title rests or in whom it "shall be vested"
because such words would be unnecessary if the property was only dedicated
to the city. As the court of appeals indicated, the street-closing statutes may
only be the legislature's solution to the rigor of the common-law rules
surrounding dedication and abandonment; however, the legislature could have
easily accomplished such a purpose without using the words "shall be vested."
Finally, the Hoogenboom court could have reached the same result
without addressing the question of whether section 57-9-20 allows the
destruction of vested rights. Under section 57-9-20, a street closing must be
in the best interest of all concerned. Arguably, the willingness of the city to
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. § 32-7-4(c).
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 354.23 (West Supp. 1993) (formerly § 409A.23).

Id.
Id.

57. NEB. REv. STAT. § 16-611 (1991).

58. Id.
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appeal the case to the court of appeals to prevent closing of The Extension
illustrates that the city did not think that closing The Extension's was in the
best interests of all concerned. Finally, no evidence demonstrated that
Hoogenboom published her intention to file a street-closing petition, as
required by section 57-9-10. Consequently, the court could have simply
dismissed Hoogenboom's petition under section 57-9-20 for failure to satisfy
the statutory requirements of sections 57-9-10 and 57-9-20. In so doing, the
court would have avoided an unnecessary construction of the statute.
Tim F. Williams
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